Why Do We Need Human Rights? (39): Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas, Ctd.

We need rights such as free speech, assembly and association (as well as other rights that function as prerequisites for these rights, such as the right not to suffer poverty) for many reasons, but one of the most important reasons is the way in which these rights protect open, public, inclusive and widespread deliberation.

But why do we need this kind of deliberation? Deliberation, ideally at least, forces ideas through a process of criticism, counter-arguments and competition with other ideas. Ideas that can get themselves accepted in such a competitive market of ideas will tend to be of better quality than other ideas. Hence the metaphor of the marketplace of ideas. A crucial point is that participation in public deliberation should be as free and as massive as possible, since only mass participation will allow for the multiplication of possible arguments and alternative ideas.

The marketplace of ideas improves the quality of our ideas and our thinking, and that’s a good thing. The fact that some human rights – and perhaps even all human rights given the interdependence of human rights – are necessary for the functioning of this marketplace justifies human rights. (More here).

I used the word “ideally” a moment ago, because the actual functioning of the marketplace of ideas in the real world is often marred by “market failures”. I listed a few here, such as confirmation bias, polarization, political correctness and other biases or processes that inhibit the free and open discussion and exchange of possibly persuasive arguments.

Here are a few more:

  • There’s what we could call the “fanatic effect”: fanatics have few if any doubts about their ideas and hence are more likely to set up lobbying groups, think tanks, political parties etc. As a result, a fanatic will receive more media exposure than the thinking person constantly revising her often complicated opinions in the light of new evidence. This is the supply side factor favoring the appearance of extreme views. Now, these views may well be correct in some cases, but it’s hard to know if those views are the ones that receive most coverage; views or arguments that go against the extremes may come from less convinced sources and hence may not find their way into the debates. As a result, the marketplace does not function adequately. This type of market failure is obviously linked to polarization, but it’s not completely the same thing. Polarization can occur between 2 or more non-fanatical or non-extreme views.
  • There’s not only a supply side factor; the demand for extreme and fanatical positions also plays a role in undermining the marketplace of ideas. Extreme positions are better for pageviews and ratings. People want good TV and interesting websites, and extremists battling each other with soundbites are better than long nuanced arguments. Who doesn’t prefer a debate between a racist and a black radical to a polite discussion based on charts, numbers and philosophical references? The soundbites may come from fanatics, but they don’t have to. If very reasonable points of view are only marketed in the form of sound bites, and if nuanced or lengthy arguments are thought to scare away viewer or readers, then the market fails just as badly.

However, let’s not despair. There’s also a lot of evidence that people arguing in groups come to better decisions than people on their own. Here’s a sample of some of the evidence:

A group of players is told that they should choose a number between 0 and 100, and the winner of the game will be the person who chooses a number that is (say) 1/2 of the average of the other choices. In this game, the rational player will reason as follows: “OK, let’s say that the other players choose randomly, so the average will be 50, and I should choose 25 to win. But if other players have this first level of insight, they will all choose 25 to win, and I should instead choose 12. But if other players have this second level of insight, then they will choose 12, and I should choose 6. Hmmm. If the other players are rational and self-interested, the equilibrium choice will end up being zero.”

The players … can be either individuals or groups. It turns out that groups choose lower numbers: that is, as a result of interacting in the group, they tend to be one step ahead.

Here’s another example … [P]layers get the following question: … “Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is more probable: (a) Linda is a bank teller. (b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.” Notice that Linda is a bank teller in both choices, but only active in the feminist movement in the second choice: that is, the second choice is a subset of the first choice. For that reason, it is impossible for choice b to be more likely than choice a. However, early research on this question found that 85% of individuals answered b. But when the game is played with groups of 2, and with groups of 3, the error rate drops. (source)

So the marketplace of ideas could justify human rights after all. More posts in this series are here.

Advertisements

3 thoughts on “Why Do We Need Human Rights? (39): Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas, Ctd.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s