The Extent of Private Property Rights

In some ways, a right to private property is similar to a right to privacy: a private property right is a right to control access to certain goods that you – as an individual or as a group of individuals – mark as “yours”, and access is of course also fundamental to privacy rights. Stated differently, a private property right is a right to make independent decisions about your goods (sell, keep, use, destroy, consume or transfer as you please) and to exclude interference with those decisions by other would-be users of those goods. If others attempt, without your permission, to use, transfer or modify goods that are “yours”, your right to property gives you the power to repel this kind of interference, with the help of the state as the enforcer of social rules (we don’t want people to rely on their own strength to enforce their property rights, because we don’t want to jeopardize security rights such as physical integrity).

Access control and the power to exclude are central to both property and privacy rights. One could even make the case that private property rights are a subset of privacy rights (no privacy without your own house for example). This link is probably why in the modern capitalist economy the words “property” and “private property” are usually synonymous. There are of course other types of property but, rightly or wrongly, those have lower status in modern economies. Interestingly, although other types of property such as common or collective property have their own logic and problems, issues of access, control and exclusion may also be relevant to them, as is evident from the “tragedy of the commons“.

Let’s leave the relative status of different kinds of property to the side for now, and focus on private property. There are two major problems with the claim that people generally have a right to private property: why is it a good thing to have private property over certain goods, and which goods can you claim as “yours”.

Possible and reasonable answers to the first question include:

  • “private property is necessary for privacy or some other value”
  • “it’s necessary for production, commerce, exchange and hence prosperity”
  • “it encourages responsible use of resources”
  • etc.

Possible answers to the second question:

  • “first come, first take” (so-called first occupancy theory)
  • “all existing distributions of property are just”
  • “take but leave enough for others” (Lockean proviso)
  • “equal shares”
  • “goods to which you have added value by way of your labor”
  • “none”, meaning there can only be common ownership, collective ownership or some other none-private form of property
  • plus a load of other possible answers.

However, let’s also leave these questions to the side for a moment. What I do want to look at now is the extent of property rights. A right to exclude others from the use of your property or a right to decide to use that property in a certain manner, may, in some cases, leave others worse off, or may even lead to their death. In general, and depending on the strength of the arguments in favor of private property (see above), you have a right to private property even if others have a greater need for the resources you own. If the needs of others would always trump property rights, then those rights wouldn’t be rights at all. It’s only when some threshold level of need is reached that the needs of others should be allowed to trump your right. Your right to property should not result in the physical suffering or death of others. Especially in the case of scarce and necessary goods, we need limits on the extent of property rights, even though property rights may perhaps only make sense when we’re dealing with such goods (why limit access to goods that aren’t scarce or necessary?). These limits are justified because we’re dealing here with a conflict of rights: property rights versus the right to life or the right not to suffer extreme poverty. As in all cases of conflicting rights, there needs to be a trade-off, and the one I’m defending here seems reasonable.

Hence, a justification of private property should never be limited to arguments about the benefits of private property but should instead find its place in a justification of rights in general, including the rights of those who are excluded, by the property rights of others, from the use of scarce and necessary resources. And any justification of rights in general needs to address possible conflicts between rights.

Access control and the power to decide and exclude are inherent in the right to private property but are not absolute powers. In this respect, the right to property is not much different from other human rights. As a society, we have to balance each and everyone’s property rights with each and everyone’s other rights, and individuals can’t demand that the state enforces their property rights – or that they themselves can enforce their property rights – when we all, as a society, have decided that in a particular case the balancing of rights has resulted in a priority of non-property rights.

Types of Privacy

In light of the recent hullabaloo over spying by the NSA, it’s useful to think a bit about the nature and justification of privacy. Privacy is a human right. It’s the right to seclude yourself or something about yourself and to restrict access by others to you own area of petty sovereignty. This area can have a bodily or physical dimension, but also an informational, relational or spatial one. Positively stated, the right to privacy is the right to appear in a selective and self-chosen way. (See also article 12 of the Universal Declaration).

Our understanding of this right is clouded because of the controversies about the exact borders of our private world and about what should or shouldn’t be a part of that world. Different people and different cultures at different times in history allow(ed) more or less intrusion, and opinions differ also about the need to reduce those borders as a means to protect other rights (security in an age of terrorism, free speech for investigative journalists etc.; more on the general problem of balancing different rights is here). The development of technology also makes it harder and harder to decide what should or shouldn’t be private (e.g. 50 years ago no one worried about DNA registers, gene patenting or CCTV).

Our understanding is also clouded because there are in fact many different types of privacy or different types of private worlds grouped under a single word: there’s the intimate, the domestic etc. Some types of privacy have a stronger moral claim than others, and the balancing with other non-privacy rights should also be done differently for different types of privacy. So there are in fact many different privacy rights.

Let’s have a look at some of the possible types of privacy and privacy rights. I’ll give you my own idiosyncratic classification consisting of 10 types. These types often overlap, of course, and the distinctions may seem a bit forced at times. Still, I think it’s useful to distinguish types of privacy because each type can be violated in a different way. In the list that follows, I’ll also mention some of the ways in which each type of privacy right can be violated. That doesn’t mean that all those violations are always unjustified. Some of them may be justified limitations of rights rather than violations.

1. Informational privacy

People have a right to decide what kind of undocumented information about themselves can be communicated, and how. Within limits of course. A criminal suspect can be forced to reveal some personal information (even if there’s a general right to remain silent). By default, however, people’s personal history or characteristics should remain secret. Examples of ways in which this type of privacy right can be violated are:

2. Mental privacy

A more specific version of information privacy is mental privacy. People have a right to keep their thoughts and feelings to themselves, given certain limitations. Violations of this right include:

  • workers who have to fill in a signed worker satisfaction survey
  • forced confessions.

3. Bodily privacy

Another more specific version of information privacy is bodily privacy, a type of privacy that serves to protect people’s intimacy. Violations of this right include:

  • giving unauthorized people access to medical records
  • security agents doing a body scan or a cavity search.

4. Anonymity privacy

Yet another more specific version of information privacy is anonymity privacy. People have, in certain circumstances, the right to be unnoticed and unnamed. Violations of this right include:

  • people are required to have, carry and present identity cards
  • journalists are forced to reveal their sources
  • a ballot that isn’t secret.

5. Relational privacy

Another specific version of information privacy is relational privacy. People have a right to keep some of their relationships or some characteristics of some relationships secret. Violations of this right include:

  • a government outlaws some types of consensual sex or marriage between adults
  • a government engages in wiretaps or opens written correspondence.

6. Associational privacy

A subtype of relational privacy is associational privacy. Some associations have a right to keep some things secret. Violations of this right include:

  • a corporation is forced to divulge trade secrets, recipes, etc.
  • church communities are forced to grant access to their rites.

7. Activity privacy

A final version of information privacy is activity privacy. People have a right to move in public spaces without being noticed, tracked or named. Violations of this right include:

8. Residential or domestic privacy

Non-informational privacy includes residential or domestic privacy. People have a right to refuse access to their homes. Violations of this right include:

  • police officers searching someone’s house without a warrant
  • trespassing
  • stalking.

9. Property privacy

People have a right to exclude interference with their property. This right to property privacy overlaps with but is slightly different from the classic private property right in the sense that it can be violated without people’s property being taken away from them. Violations of this right include:

  • some forms of property searches by law enforcement officers
  • some forms of property prohibitions (e.g. obscene material).

10. Spatial privacy

People have a right to their own living space and the right to exclude others from this space, even if this space is not a house. Inmates, for example, although they don’t live in their own house and can’t regulate access to their cells, nevertheless have a right to spatial privacy. Violations of this right include:

  • prison conditions that are so bad that inmates have to live too close to each other
  • homelessness.

In the general scheme of spheres of life, our private world is not just distinct and separated from the sphere of government intervention, law and politics. It’s also distinct from the sphere of publicity and civil society, since we also have to be protected against violations of our privacy by fellow citizens.

The private sphere can be divided in 4 sub-spheres: the self/mind, the body, the home/space and relationships/associations. Each sub-sphere would cover 1 or more of the 10 types of privacy:

  • the self/mind sphere covers informational privacy, mental privacy, anonymity privacy, activity privacy and property privacy
  • the body sphere covers informational privacy and bodily privacy
  • the home/space sphere covers residential or domestic privacy as well as spatial and property privacy
  • the relationships/association sphere covers relational and associational privacy.

In the examples given above of invasions into the private sphere, I haven’t expressed my opinion on the legitimacy of those invasion. All I claimed was that the right to privacy isn’t absolute and that some limitations/violations of that right will be necessary. I can now give some examples of what I believe are illegitimate invasions of certain sub-spheres of the private sphere:

  1. unlawful house searches by the police force
  2. unlawful house searches by the police force, combined with unlawful body searches
  3. excessively intrusive security checks and body scans outside of the home (e.g. at the airport); excessive use of DNA registers; unauthorized access to medical records
  4. publication of embarrassing personal facts; forced confessions
  5. criminalization of consensual sex between adults
  6. criminalization of gay or interracial marriage; publication of addresses of convicted pedophiles
  7. excessive regulation of private associations (businesses, churches etc.); journalists being forced to reveal their sources.

See also this previous post on the subject.

Religion and Human Rights (31): Polygamy, Right or Rights Violation?

In the U.S., 9 states – including Utah, the center of Mormonism – make polygamy a crime, while 49 states have bigamy statutes that can be used to prosecute polygamous families. Polygamy is only legal in North Africa and most of the Muslim world. Does it make sense to promote the right to same-sex, interracial and interreligious marriage, and at the same time oppose polygamy? (By the way, polygamy usually means polygyny: one husband, multiple wives – the opposite, polyandry, is extremely rare).

Marriage is a recognized human right, but does the word “marriage”, as it is used in human rights language, also cover polygamous marriage? From the texts of human rights treaties and declarations, it’s not even clear that it covers same-sex marriage – although it undoubtedly covers interracial and interreligious marriage. The word “marriage” isn’t clearly defined in the texts. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration merely states the following:

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Polygamy or same-sex marriage aren’t specifically mentioned as being forms of marriage that are included in the right to marry, but neither is it the case that sexual orientation or the numbers of partners are stipulated as unwarranted limitations to the right to marry. So the phrasing as it stands neither includes nor excludes polygamy or same-sex marriage as a right. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights isn’t much clearer.

However, the case for same-sex or interracial marriage can be based on other articles, such as the non-discrimination provisions. Article 2 of the International Covenant states:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Sexual orientation is not mentioned but it is accepted that the list given here is a list of examples and not exhaustive. “Without distinction of any kind” is clear enough. Article 3 states:

The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.

And Article 26:

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

It’s not clear whether polygamists can invoke the same non-discrimination provisions. Perhaps the right to privacy can help them. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence… Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

However, apart from the question whether polygamy can be defended or not on the basis of existing human rights law, there are some good reasons why perhaps there shouldn’t be a right to polygamous marriage, even if it can be established that there is such a right. Wives may be pressured into polygamous marriages or prohibited from exiting them; they may suffer inequality and oppression in their marriage; and young girls may be forced to marry. The same risks exist of course in normal monogamous marriage, but are perhaps more important in polygamous marriage.

Moreover, polygamous marriage poses certain risks that are non-existent in normal marriage: excess boys in polygamous communities are often ostracized and condemned to a life of poverty and homelessness; and there’s a risk that marriage as an institution and as a general right may suffer when polygamy becomes widespread:

Polygamy is bad social policy for exactly the reason gay marriage is good social policy: everyone should have the opportunity to marry. Broad access to marriage is important not only for individual wellbeing but for social stability. And, to oversimplify only a little, when one man gets two wives, some other man gets no wife. There’s no better path to inequality, social unrest, and authoritarian social structures than polygamy. (source)

And yet, if it’s the case that

  • polygamy remains a fringe custom
  • polygamists are generally exercising their free choice and informed consent
  • no children are forced to marry or are sexually abused
  • and excess boys are not ostracized

then why would anyone oppose polygamy? Monogamous marriage isn’t illegal because some wives are beaten or because there are some cases of monogamous child marriage. One could oppose polygamy for religious reasons, but those aren’t sufficient in liberal democracies. Polygamy can only be problematic when it’s a practice that regularly and intrinsically leads to rights violations, as it does when child brides are common, when wives are commonly forced into marriage or when widespread polygamy makes it very difficult for men to find brides and marry.

Another thing to consider is gender equality. Even if polygamy is rare enough not to deny men a reasonable chance of marriage, and even if all polygamous wives are adults who freely consent to their marriage and who have equal standing within their marriages, then it’s still the case that the practice itself can signal gender inequality and hence perpetuate it. The reason is that polygyny, by its very nature, signals that men have more rights than women: a man can take several wives, but not vice versa. A legal right to polygamy would of course also entail a right to polyandry, but it’s unlikely that the risks to gender equality created by polygyny would be offset by many cases of polyandry. The more likely result is that polygyny fosters preexisting misogynistic prejudice because polygyny will always be more common that polyandry.

So, in the end a lot depends on how often polygamy results in rights violations. Is polygamy more like child marriage, which by definition is a rights violation (it involves pedophilia, the denial of education, health problems resulting from pregnancy at an early age etc.)? Or is it more like monogamous or same-sex marriage, which may produce rights violations such as domestic violence, but not intrinsically so? If some practice by definition violates rights, it should obviously be prohibited. If the practice only does so by accident and exceptionally, then it should in general be protected, especially when the practice itself is a human right. I claim that there is nothing inherently wrong with polygamy, as long as it’s not set up in such a way that it violates rights – as long as in most cases the wives consent (in an informed way), children are left alone, boys aren’t ostracized, and the practice isn’t so widespread that men can’t marry or that women feel they are second class citizens.

In this respect, polygamy is similar to hate speech. In the case of hate speech we are also dealing with a presumptive right, but one that can be abrogated when its exercise becomes too widespread with negative consequences for the rights of others. When a small black minority for instance is overwhelmed by hate speech, to such an extent that black people can’t go outside for fear of constant insult, then their right to freedom of movement should trump the speech rights of the haters.

For a more pessimistic view on polygamy, go here.

Hate (8): Tolerance and Hate Speech

Jeremy Waldron claims that tolerance is more than merely the absence of violent assault on people who have adopted beliefs and practices we don’t like, and more than simply abstaining from persecution and legal sanction. He says that tolerance also implies the absence of hate speech and a legal prohibition of hate speech. Members of minority groups whose beliefs and practices are strongly disapproved of by the rest of society, have a right to go about their lives without the threat of constant hatred, vilification, insult and humiliation. They have a right to visit the shops and restaurants they want to visit, and to generally interact with others without being treated as pariahs.

And, indeed, that sounds quite reasonable. People undoubtedly have and should have such rights. But others have rights as well: hate mongers have a right to free speech, and racist shop keepers and restaurant owners have a right to ban whoever they want from their private property, under certain circumstances.

When the rights of the haters and the rights of despised minorities come into conflict, the different rights have to be balanced. I argued before that the right of private property of racists, or the freedom of association of prejudiced groups wanting to exclude homosexuals for example, should no longer be protected when these racists and bigots have become so numerous and authoritative that the objects of their racism or bigotry no longer have any alternative options and risk having their own rights violated. In the Jim Crow era, for example, it was very difficult for blacks to move around, find decent housing etc. because there were so many transport companies and landowners discriminating against them that their options were seriously diminished. Hence their rights were violated, and violated to such a degree that limitations on the rights of their tormentors were justified.

Similarly, in our current example, hate speech should only be banned and the right to free speech of hate mongers should only be limited when there’s an impact on the rights of their targets. Claiming, as Waldron seems to do, that a tolerant society generally requires such bans and limits will not do. That’s just not enough as a justification. For example, writing blood libel on an obscure blog that nobody reads should probably not be prohibited. On the other hand, burning crosses in the front yards of black people and forcing them to move elsewhere is a violation of their right to freely choose their residence. The same is true if people dare not walk the streets because of the risk of being constantly cursed at. These two cases of expressions of hate speech can and should be banned because they result in rights violations. Other expressions of hate speech should be protected. A general claim that tolerance requires not just constraints on coercion and violent persecution but also a general respect for people’s dignity and a social atmosphere free of hatred, insult and defamation, goes too far. It would be nice if the world was free of hate and if respect for dignity was the normal attitude, but there’s no right to such a world. Nor should there be.

If we were to adopt such a right, we’d run the risk of terminating debate altogether. If tolerance includes a general ban on hate speech it’s likely that it will also imply banning vehement discussion of other people’s supposed errors. You don’t need to engage in hate speech in order to have a vehement and lively discussion and criticism of others, but a lot of such criticism can be readily understood and perceived by its targets as an expression of hate and an insult to dignity. These targets can then use the power of law to shut down the debate, and that’s not something we want. Ideally, specific instances of speech should not be judged as inadmissible instances of hate speech and proper objects of legal sanction simply on the basis of the feelings or perceptions of the targets, but only on the basis of the objective consequences for the rights of the targets. Tolerance that includes a ban on all hate speech is a tolerance that in the end may silence us all.

More on tolerance, hate speech, defamation and insults. More posts in this series are here.

Limiting Free Speech (49): Residential Picketing

Residential picketing is a common form of protest. First you identify someone you don’t like – say an abortion doctor, a bank CEO or a pedophile. Then you find out where she lives, show up with a group of protesters at her home, and stage a long running protest just outside of it. Maybe your group shouts insults or curses every time she goes in or out. Maybe you stay at night as well.

The general rule is that you are allowed to do this. You’re in a public space and you can speak freely, even if your speech is insulting. However, this type of residential picketing can in some cases go so far as to violate the rights of the person who is picketed. Her freedom of movement, her right to privacy and her freedom of residence may suffer. She may feel intimidated, a feeling that forces her to stay at home or away from home. See may feel under siege and no longer safe in the privacy of her home. She may even believe that it’s necessary to move.

The protesters should accept some types of limitation of residential picketing rights when this picketing violates other rights. For example, if they are forced to respect a buffer zone around the residence, then they can still disseminate their message. Their alternatives are much easier and less costly than the alternatives for the person who is picketed. However, they know full well that their message will have a much stronger media impact if it produces some controversy, and harassing someone by keeping her a virtual hostage under siege in her own house is bound to be controversial. Hence they’re not likely to scale down the protest and respect a buffer zone.

The point is that free speech rights are not automatically prior or superior to other rights, especially not if those speech rights are used in such a way that they must violate other rights and that alternative uses are rejected. There’s no hierarchy among human rights and all rights are equivalent. That means that when rights are in conflict with each other, the decision to favor one or the other must take into account the respective costs to one or the other. In this case, the cost to privacy, freedom of movement etc. of allowing free speech is clearly higher than the cost we impose on free speech when we want to protect privacy, movement and residence rights. The protesters can still express themselves outside a buffer zone and in myriad other ways. The person who is picketed can also move to another house, but that is much more costly and possibly futile (given a certain level of persistence among the protesters). The right to free speech does not include a right to maximum impact speech.

The US case law in question is Frisby v Schultz. Something on the related topic of the duty to listen. More posts in this series are here.

Poverty and Privacy

The poor suffer certain specific violations of their right to privacy, and it’s fair to say that in general poverty means less privacy. Being poor often means having substandard housing. Without a proper house, or without a house at all, it’s much more difficult to be private. Furthermore, poverty often implies that people live together in “extended families”, perhaps even with others who aren’t family at all, strictly speaking. And this also reduces privacy in several ways (most obviously the intimate side of privacy).

In addition, being poor means being dependent on government welfare. But in order to benefit from welfare payments, tax credits, subsidies etc. the poor have to prove that they are indeed poor. Hence they have to divulge personal information to the government, and the government has a right to check this information. Some governments even have the right to do home searches in pursuit of welfare fraud.

If you view abortion as an aspect of privacy, then there’s an additional way in which poverty hurts privacy: the poor, because they have less access to birth control, will want to engage in abortion more often, and will therefore have their privacy violated by anti-abortion laws. Because the poor use public transportation more often, they are more likely to be tracked by police surveillance systems. They represent a disproportionate part of the prison population, and prison life obviously isn’t good for privacy. The poor are also more likely to be illegal immigrants, and therefore subject to control by the competent government agencies.

On the other hand, being poor allows people to avoid some types of privacy invasion: they use the internet less and hence are less at risk of internet related privacy violations; the poorest of the poor are less likely to take credit (credit means telling the bank about your income, spending, previous credit scores etc.) or to enroll in fidelity schemes (in which the use of a fidelity card tells the shop what you consume). Perhaps they won’t be taxed as much – or at all – and therefore don’t have to divulge private information to the tax authorities.

Still, on balance poverty is likely to have an adverse effect on privacy. Some even say that the poor are targeted by the government and that they are discriminated in their right to privacy simply because of their poverty. For instance, the way in which governments do home searches in pursuit of welfare fraud would be unthinkable if it were directed at other purposes and other social classes. It seems that the poor don’t only lose their privacy but also their right to privacy.

And poverty often also means the forfeiture of other, non-privacy rights. Simply begging or being homeless can still land you in jail and can get you kicked out of public places. In most countries, the days are gone when poor people were sterilized against their will, excluded from the vote, their children taken away from them etc. But in many parts of the world, poor children are still discouraged from going to school and forced into labor or warfare. Healthcare for the poor is still a problem, even in some developed countries, making it less likely that their health rights are respected. So don’t tell me poverty isn’t a human rights issue.

What is Democracy? (53): Secret Ballot, or Public Vote?

The secret ballot has become so common in modern democracies that it’s hardly ever questioned. And yet, there are good reasons why a democratic vote should be public. So, let’s go over the pros and cons of the secret ballot, and see where that gets us.

Advantages of the secret ballot

  • The desire to avoid voter intimidation or bribery is the obvious and most commonly cited justification of the secrecy of the ballot. If people in power know how an individual votes, then this individual may be pressured to vote in a certain way. And “people in power” should be understood in a broad sense, including employers, dominant husbands etc. This justification is based on certain key features of a democracy, namely equal influence, one-man-one-vote etc. The risk of coercion is present even in societies where the general level of coercion is low and democratic values are widely shared. And it’s often the least advantaged who will be coerced, because they have most to gain from changing their vote to please someone else, and most to lose from not doing so.
  • The risk of pressure can also be present in other, more subtle forms. For example, it has been shown that people are afraid to publicly oppose authority figures. Tests have shown that when an authority figure speaks first, there’s less dissent afterwards. An open ballot can lead to forced conformity.

Disadvantages of the secret ballot

  • Implicit in the doctrine of the secret ballot is the assumption that the electoral process is no more than the aggregation of individual preferences which have been fixed previously and independently of the electoral process. However, the voting process is, ideally, also formative of preferences, and not merely an arithmetic process based on fixed preferences. That means that people deliberate and discuss about the best way to vote, about the best candidates and policies. But that also means that people have to present their positions and preferences in public. Maybe the ultimate vote can still be secret, but the initial voting intention can’t be if we want democracy to be a lively debate. But if the voting intention can be public, why not the actual vote?
  • An open ballot allows representatives to know exactly whom they are representing. One of the advantages of this knowledge is that it allows for some efficiency gains. Representatives know who has to be convinced. Those efficiency gains should improve the electoral process.
  • When you vote in an election for representatives or in a referendum, this vote has real consequences. Taken together with the votes of your fellow citizens, your vote is likely to change the lives of a number of people, and sometimes change these lives dramatically. Moreover, those people are likely to be minorities, and hence relatively powerless. It’s therefore important that voters are accountable to their fellow citizens and that they explain and justify the reasons they have for voting in a certain way. This horizontal accountability is incompatible with the secret ballot.
  • Why should we have secret ballots for voters and at the same time open votes in parliament, as is usually the case? After all, the justifications for a secret ballot for voters also apply to representatives. They also may be subject to pressure when it’s known how they vote. Maybe to a lesser extent than some parts of the electorate, since they tend to be wealthy and generally powerful, but still. Representatives are less numerous, and hence it’s easier and more effective to use pressure in order to manipulate a vote. Also, the public nature of representatives’ positions makes them vulnerable to specific kinds of pressure that can’t be applied to ordinary citizens (e.g. they may be blackmailed for indecent private behavior and thereby pressured to vote in a certain way). Of course, representative bodies are different from electorates, and therefore not entirely comparable. For example, it’s hard to see how a representative body can be accountable to the electorate when it votes in secret. Voters have to know what the individual representatives have accomplished, or not, so that they can “throw the bums out” at the next election if necessary. Also, this threat of non-reelection can pressure the representatives to act in ways desired by the electorate. So, pressure – at least some kind of pressure – is part and parcel of the representative process, whereas it’s incompatible with a popular vote. However, even if a vote by representatives isn’t entirely comparable to a vote by the people, it still is somewhat comparable, and people arguing for a secret ballot in a general election will have to explain why their arguments don’t also apply to votes in parliament.
  • Open ballots, both in representative bodies and in general, force people to restrict themselves to preferences and arguments that they can justify to others. If you vote in a certain way, and are seen to be voting in a certain way, people will ask you why. And if you’re pressured to answer this question and to justify your vote (or voting intention), it’s a lot more difficult to be motivated, or to be seen to be motivated by self-interest only. Hence, the open ballot will make voters more sensitive to the general interest, which is a good thing. Also, this public justification tends to improve the quality of preferences, since people have to think about them, argue about them with others etc. That’s the logic of the marketplace of ideas.
  • And, finally, open ballots make electoral fraud a lot more difficult, if not impossible.

Obviously, not all of these advantages and disadvantages have the same importance, and they don’t make it instantly clear whether a secret or an open ballot should be preferred in principle. Much depends on the specific circumstances. For example, in a country with a lot of economic inequality and gender inequality, the case for a secret ballot for voters is relatively strong. In general, a mixed system is probably best. However, we don’t have such a mixed system at the moment. Most modern democracies strongly favor secret ballots, and seem to ignore the real problems resulting from such a system. I believe some more attention should be given to these problems and to possible solutions, which obviously doesn’t mean that we should go to the other extreme and deny people’s right to keep their opinions to themselves if they so wish. There can’t be a duty of free speech.