Do We Live in a Simulation, Or Are We Already Dead in the Real World?

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Some say that we live in a computer simulation, and that we just don’t know it yet. Perhaps God-like creatures, on another planet somewhere, have colonised us and put us in Matrix-style liquid-filled pods, our brains attached to a computer and fed with fake experiences. Proponents of the simulation hypothesis rightly point out that it may be wrong to call such experiences “fake”. We do have them after all, and whether these experiences come from a real world interacting with us or from a computer program pretending to be a world doesn’t make a lot of difference as long as we don’t know the truth of the matter. “Truth” may be a similarly slippery concept. (Nozick’s experience machine is a whole different case, because in that thought experiment the point is whether we would choose to live in such a machine. Here we assume that we don’t have such a choice).

Elon Musk has recently popularised the simulation hypothesis, although it’s centuries old. Descartes’ “dieu trompeur” is a famous example: an evil demon presenting a complete illusion of an external world to our senses, or maybe directly to our minds, or mind in the singular.

Also, rather than Matrix-style pods, we may simply be brains in a vat, or even less: emulations of brains “living” in a computer.

Whatever the merits of this hypothesis, I think they pale in comparison to another one: we are, in fact, already dead. The latter is, in my opinion, much more likely and fits better with the available evidence. Let me have a go.

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The simulation hypothesis can indeed explain all the evidence – since all evidence is facts and all facts can conceivably be simulated by some or other entity. The problem however is precisely this entity. Who or what could it be? The most likely explanation is that the simulating entity is part of humanity itself, perhaps a future generation. But why? Why on earth (or elsewhere) would they enslave physical human bodies, put them to sleep, immerse them in vats and connect them to computers in order to feed them sensations of a non-existing world? Why would they remove their brains or emulate their brains? I don’t see the point. The Matrix plot – humans as a power source – is obviously ridiculous. Emulated brains as instruments of computing power is a similarly weak rationale for the simulation hypothesis (when it becomes technologically possible to emulate brains, there won’t be a reason to fool them; just use their computing power if you don’t have better, non-brain based computing machines, which seems unlikely to me). The same lack of rationale applies to the possibility of aliens or Gods as simulating entities. It seems likely that they as well, just like future humans, would have better things to do.

Whomever is the simulating entity, it must have a reason for its actions. Even the fun of it or outright sadism could not support the simulation hypothesis: it wouldn’t be much fun to the simulators, not even if they’re sadists: our possibly simulated world is often awful but not awful enough to be the product of a sadist entity seeking to enjoy itself at our expense.

So the evidence seems to be against the simulation hypothesis. What about my alternative? Let’s call it the Cotard hypothesis after the well-known Cotard delusion: a mental illness in which the affected person holds the delusional belief that he or she is already dead. Although of course in this case we’re not dealing with a delusion. The delusion would be that we’re still alive.

Think about unrequited love, the glances in the subway that went unnoticed, the promotion that you failed to get, the times that your husband ignored what you were saying… Often trivial and banal occurrences, but taken together they may have some weight. Perhaps more weight than the simulation hypothesis. Countervailing evidence can also be explained. The times when you weren’t ignored may have been wishful thinking. After all, it’s easier to believe that you are alive than that you are dead, and so your mind may fabricate “evidence” to convince you that you are in fact alive. Such fabrications are not unheard of: there’s the just world fallacy, we have adaptive preferences and suffer from confirmation bias. And a lot of these biases are unconscious.

Think also about the sadness of some of the memories of early childhood. Good memories maybe, but also sad at the same time because that world is gone, that life is gone. Your life is gone. This fits also nicely with the increasingly popular notion that there is no such thing as en enduring personal identity. We “die” every moment.

(An interesting fictional treatment of the Cotard delusion is the TV-series Talking to the Dead – forget the IMDB ranking, it’s BS. And there’s of course The Sixth Sense).

Religion and Human Rights (34): What Happens When You Want to Make Politics and the World More Religious?

You’ve probably guessed from the title where this post is heading, so in order to avoid the obvious misunderstandings I’ll reiterate my basic position on the role of religion in contemporary society: I’m an agnostic, but I fully understand the importance of religion for religious people; I believe that part of the function of human rights is to protect those people, and that another part of that function is to protect the rest of us against them; yet I don’t believe some of the overblown but unfortunately very fashionable statements about the extent of the religious threat to society; and neither do I believe that principles such as the separation of church and state imply religion should have no voice at all in democratic politics.

So, now that this is out of the way, let me try to answer the question in the title. The answer will be predictable, but perhaps also somewhat illuminating in the details.

In modern-day democracies, rulers no longer claim a divine right to rule and most of them admit that they don’t have the authority to further the cause of God on earth by violent and coercive means. They can speak and persuade, but wars against against foreign sinners and oppression of domestic heretics is not done. However, the word “most” does a lot of work here. Many democratic politicians, backed by their religious supporters, still try to shape politics and the law according to religion and try to use those earthly powers as means to make the world more religious. That’s fully consistent with the universalist claims inherent in their religious beliefs: their God isn’t just their God but the God of all humanity, and all of humanity has a duty to obey the word of God. If this obedience can be promoted through the use of politics and the law, then religious citizens have a religious duty to try. Their attempts typically follow a number of steps:

1. Demand religious freedom

They start of from the very reasonable claim that they themselves have a right to live their own lives according to their religious faith, unmolested by the state or by other citizens. The first of their religious duties is to obey the word of God themselves, and they should be allowed by the state and the law to do so. That is indeed their human right and they are entirely justified in using politics and the law to protect that right.

2. Demand religious exemptions

However, some religious people interpret this right to religious freedom in a rather loose way. For example, they see this right not merely as a means to fend off anti-religious and hostile legislation or other forms of state action intentionally interfering with their religion (or hostile private action for that matter). They see their right to religious liberty also as a right to disrespect general and non-religiously motivated legislation which they believe violates the word of God.

For example, a law imposing a military draft may be seen as illegitimate by the adherents of a pacifist religion, and a law requiring the use of crash helmets should not be forced upon the followers of a religion that demands the wearing of turbans. Hence, religious people often demand that they should be exempted from the application of certain laws – or at least their right to conscientious objection should be respected – when they view those laws as being against the word of God.

I’ve argued elsewhere that such exemptions – which take us one step further than simple religious liberty – can be justified in some cases, but that we should be careful not to undermine the rule of law.

3. Demand religious laws

Some want to go even further than that. From the point of view of a religious person, the two previous demands on politics and the law were strictly self-regarding: religious people should be allowed to live their own lives according to their own beliefs. However, as I stated above, religion is hardly ever purely self-regarding. Most religious people feel a strong urge to work for the salvation of their fellow human beings. Hence, instead of demanding personal exemptions from laws that inadvertently violate the requirements of their religion, some religious people want to abolish the laws in question and replace them with laws that better promote those requirements.

If we take the same example as above, they may want to abolish the law imposing a military draft, rather than just asking for a personal exemption. Their religion requires not just that they personally refrain from violence, but that humanity does so as well. Hence they would like to end the military altogether rather than just their personal participation in it.

Or take the more salient example of laws permitting same-sex marriages. Many religious citizens claim a right to abolish such laws. Their religion doesn’t permit what these laws permit. And even if they have received a personal exemption so that the laws don’t force them to act against their religion (same-sex marriage laws don’t force people into a same-sex marriage, nor do they force people to validate and recognize the same-sex marriages of others), laws such as these do make it possible for other people to act against the word of God. Hence, some religious people want the abolition of such laws, thereby saving people in the eyes of God. However, the implication is that people’s rights are violated by the religiously inspired removal of laws that guaranteed people’s rights. Maybe religious people want to claim that this is the price to pay for the preservation of their right to religious liberty, but I fail to see how people’s religious liberty is violated by the self-regarding actions of others. (More on the relationship between religious liberty and same-sex marriage is here).

4. Demand religious laws that violate human rights

Now, it’s perfectly OK for religious people to try to move the law in a certain direction, just as it is OK for other people to try to move the law in their preferred direction. I don’t buy the theory that says that in a diverse and tolerant modern democracy religious people should refrain from using religious reasons for legislation or the reform of legislation (sometimes called the Doctrine of Religious Restraint). Religious people are allowed to work against what they see as anti-religious laws and also to promote religiously inspired laws, on the condition that the laws we end up with have managed to convince a majority and do not violate the rights of others (see here for a detailed version of this argument).

For example, a law abolishing the draft or the military could be a religiously inspired law (although it can simultaneously be inspired by secular reasons), but it could also be acceptable when it’s clear that it doesn’t violate anyone’s human rights, e.g. assuming there is no military or terrorist threat. When there is such a threat the law could lead to rights violations and hence should be resisted. Things are clearer in the case of a religiously inspired law outlawing same-sex-marriage. Such a law should always be resisted since people have a human right to get married. The same is true for blasphemy laws and a whole range of other religiously inspired laws.

The efforts by religious people to make politics, the law and the world more religious go too far when those efforts include legislation

  1. that makes non-religious people or people adhering to another religion live according to the precepts of the legislator’s religion, and
  2. that violates the human rights of some.

Those efforts are understandable from the point of view of the religious legislators, since their religion requires them to work for the salvation of everyone, but they are not acceptable.

5. The ultimate step

So there’s an increasing intensity in the demands to make politics, the law and the world more religious: the law should not intervene with religion; then the law should be more considerate of religion and provide exemptions; then it should promote religion; and then it should promote religion even if that means violating the human rights of some. If, however, there is something blocking this increasingly intensive intervention and the law and politics do not cooperate sufficiently, some religious people will take matters into their own hands. After all, one can’t accept that the word of God is trumped by an anti-religious democratic majority or by a religious law that isn’t sufficiently respected. Direct action to make the world more religious is then required. You may then see someone attacking a Danish cartoonist for being blasphemous. Or someone else killing abortion doctors. Fortunately, very few religious people go all the way, which is the reason for the optimism I expressed at the beginning of this post.

Should we conclude from this that it’s best to keep religion as far away as possible from politics and the law? I don’t think so. As long as religious people respect human rights they can do as they please. Given the importance of religion to many of us, it’s illusory in the best case and counterproductive in the worst case to try to artificially ban religion from politics and the law.

Other posts in this series are here.

Religion and Human Rights (33): Christianity and Human Rights

Nowadays, when religion is viewed through the lens of human rights, the subject of discussion is most often Islam and the rights violations it is supposed to produce. Other religions seem almost unproblematic in comparison. Some even claim that human rights are the heritage of the Christian West. That’s not entirely fair to Islam, and neither is it a correct description of Christianity or of the history of human rights. Both Islam and Christianity can be criticized from the perspective of human rights. It’s about time that Christianity receives some of the same scrutiny that is heaped on Islam on a daily basis.

First, though, let’s list some arguments for the defense. Many aspects of Christianity are beneficial to human rights. For example, there’s a long tradition of pacifism in Christianity (in some Christian churches more than others, and in theory more than in practice). That’s based on the quote from the sermon on the mount about showing the other cheek. Poverty and charity as well are prominent in Christian teaching (for example in the parable of the good Samaritan). Also important from the perspective of human rights is the teaching of the equality of all human beings: we are all created in the image of God, we’re all sons and daughters of Adam and Eve. Hence differences between races, genders, nationalities etc. are contingent and morally irrelevant. And there’s of course the sacredness of human life. Finally, belief in hell – to the extent that this is still a part of present-day Christian faith – is associated with lower crime rates (I assume the fear of punishment in the afterlife limits deviance in this life).

However, it’s just as easy to cite arguments for the prosecution. First, the noble principles just cited were rarely respected. And secondly, there are a lot of other principles that are incompatible with human rights. Like all monotheistic religions, Christianity has universalist pretensions: the Christian God is the God of all, and non-believers are mistaken, even sinfully mistaken. They need to be brought within the right faith. Hence missionary work, colonialism, religious wars and other forms of aggressive proselytizing. All such activities can and often do violate human rights.

As a result of this universalism, freedom of religion is only grudgingly accepted if at all, as is the separation between church and state. Its universalist pretensions often justify coercive means, including the state, as a means to impose Christian teachings (the issue of gay marriage is only one example). It also seems that, theoretically at least, Christians can’t accept democratic decisions that go against the will of God, and are morally obliged to revolt against such decisions. Politics is the handmaiden of religion, and political rights are only contingently secure, i.e. they are secure as long as their results conform to the will of God and as long as Christians don’t believe that its practical and feasible to impose this will when rights deviate from it. Anti-abortion terrorism comes to mind.

Publicity and appearance are important parts of human rights. Different human rights protect the public appearance of a diversity of opinions, beliefs and identities, and their discursive interaction. That’s the idea of the marketplace of ideas. Christianity, however, doesn’t like publicity, for a variety of reasons. First, the relationship to God is more important than relationships between people, and the afterlife is more important than earthly life in community. There’s a strong sense of detachment from the affairs of this world, although this sense was more common in early Christianity. The hidden and the mysterious are valued more than the discursive, ostentatious life of public debate.

Appearance is not only of secondary importance, but also morally dubious. Christianity rejects seeing and being seen. To be good is the supreme value, but goodness must hide itself. When good works become public, they loose some of their goodness because they are no longer done simply for their goodness but for honor, appreciation etc. (as Arendt reminded us). In this respect, there are some similarities between the saint and the criminal.

To the extent that public debate is valued, it isn’t because of the importance of the marketplace of ideas, a major justification of human rights. Free speech doesn’t serve the exchange of arguments, public reasoning or the improvement of the quality of thinking. It only serves to proselytize, to distribute the truth, and this truth is given before public discourse even takes place. Belief is revealed and contemplated individually and in solitude, and is not the product of discussion or debate. Contemplation of God does not even require company, let alone debate. In the words of Tertullian : “nec ulla magis res aliena quam publica” (“nothing is more strange to us than public matters”).

This rejection of the public space in favor of the mysterious, of individual contemplation and of the afterlife, can result in political acquiescence. The powers-that-be are accepted, even if they are cruel and oppressive, since true salvation comes only after death. (That’s Marx’ famous criticism).

And there are other points of criticism: notwithstanding the equality of all human beings as children of God, women are responsible for the original sin, and the Jews for the murder of Christ. And even if everyone is an equal son or daughter of God, that means that everyone is fit for salvation. Which in turn means that you have to go to the far ends of the world to convert the heathens, for their own good.

A mixed record, to say the least.

Other posts in this series are here.

Religion and Human Rights (32): Human Rights and Legal Pluralism

When people talk about legal pluralism, they refer to the fact that different legal and judicial systems co-exist within one geographical area. Some examples:

  • The laws that are valid within a state are often a mix of national and international legislation.
  • In many ex-colonies, some of the laws have been imported from (and by) the colonizing country, while others have a more traditional origin and date from before the colonization.
  • Some countries have recognized indigenous claims and transformed those into rights, laws and judicial procedures. These indigenous laws and procedures may be valid only for disputes among members of the indigenous populations, but they may also affect the rights and interests of other citizens – as in the case of hunting rights, land rights etc. Indigenous rights may then come into conflict with other elements of the law, such as equality, non-discrimination, property rights etc.
  • Other countries revive traditional law or traditional informal justice mechanisms because rulers are inspired by their religion to do so – as in the case of Shari’a – or because they believe that their formal systems aren’t capable of dealing with the existing demand for justice – as in the case of the Gacaca courts in Rwanda.
  • Some subpopulations have developed their own informal justice mechanisms that operate without the approval or interference of formal state bodies: criminal gangs may create and enforce their own rules, and the same is true for terrorist groups like the IRA.

As is clear from these examples, the relationship between legal pluralism and human rights is a difficult one. Even if we set aside gang law (a marginal phenomenon that doesn’t affect large numbers of people) and indigenous law (which is a problem that can be solved), we’re still left with a problem, and it’s one that affects mainly poor and developing countries. In other words, countries where human rights are often already precarious for other reasons.

Many developing countries, and especially the poorest ones where the formal state systems of law and justice are underperforming or perhaps even failing altogether, are tempted to condone or even promote and quasi-institutionalize some of the existing informal and traditional systems, because those are the only ones operating somewhat effectively and with some level of legitimacy. It’s difficult to estimate how the positive side of this balances out with the clear risks to human rights that it entails. Let’s have a look at both sides of the coin.

Advantages of informal justice systems

Informal justice systems are obviously to be welcomed when they are the only or main source of justice. People need ways to settle their disputes and claim their rights, and when the formal system fails then an informal one may be better than nothing. And formal systems in many countries fail re obviously failing, because of many different reasons:

  • A lack of resources: institutions may be underdeveloped, people may not have the right qualifications; prosecutors in the formal system may not have the material resources to investigate crimes and claims in hard to reach parts of the country; people seeking justice may not have the means to travel to the city, which is where the formal system usually operates.
  • The lingering effects of violent conflict or genocide.
  • Language problems or cultural and religious sensitivities: for example, some people may not speak the official national language, which is the only language accepted in the formal system.
  • Etc.

It’s estimated that informal justice systems deal with over 70% of all disputes in some developing countries. That can probably be interpreted as an indictment of the formal system.

Disadvantages of informal justice systems

There’s a clear risk of gender discrimination since most informal justice systems are traditional and/or based on religion. For many women, the outcome of informal systems may be worse than nothing. There’s also the issue of cruel and inhumane punishments being handed out by some traditional courts, and it’s certain that none of the existing informal justice systems provide all the guarantees for the fairness of trials: appeals are often impossible, the justices are not selected or appointed on the basis of their qualifications, they are not removable or accountable, and hence in many cases corrupt or partial.

One of the causes of this lack of attention to human rights is that many informal justice systems are about keeping and restoring social harmony and about the maintenance of relationships and peace. Individual interests and therefore individual rights as well come second. Informal justice systems are meant to settle disputes; they are not a means to give everyone what he or she deserves or has a right to have, but rather a means to guarantee social stability. They are not about designating winners or losers in a dispute.

That is why you often see “solutions” such as a fine payable in livestock as compensation for murder. That’s not a real punishment for the perpetrator since it’s often his clan or tribe that has to pay, and neither is it real justice for the victim or his family. But it does help to maintain the peace and relationships between groups. And perhaps that is also what is most important to some of the victims, more important perhaps than criminal-type justice. Victims may believe that it is more beneficial for them, in the long run, to maintain good relations with others on whom they depend economically than to pursue criminal charges and individual rights.

This emphasis on social harmony is also a threat to the principle of the equality before the law: members of out-groups or groups that are considered unimportant for social harmony will not get a fair hearing.

So the evaluation is mixed: informal justice systems are OK is there is nothing better, but we should be careful when promoting them.

Religion and Human Rights (31): Polygamy, Right or Rights Violation?

In the U.S., 9 states – including Utah, the center of Mormonism – make polygamy a crime, while 49 states have bigamy statutes that can be used to prosecute polygamous families. Polygamy is only legal in North Africa and most of the Muslim world. Does it make sense to promote the right to same-sex, interracial and interreligious marriage, and at the same time oppose polygamy? (By the way, polygamy usually means polygyny: one husband, multiple wives – the opposite, polyandry, is extremely rare).

Marriage is a recognized human right, but does the word “marriage”, as it is used in human rights language, also cover polygamous marriage? From the texts of human rights treaties and declarations, it’s not even clear that it covers same-sex marriage – although it undoubtedly covers interracial and interreligious marriage. The word “marriage” isn’t clearly defined in the texts. Article 16 of the Universal Declaration merely states the following:

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Polygamy or same-sex marriage aren’t specifically mentioned as being forms of marriage that are included in the right to marry, but neither is it the case that sexual orientation or the numbers of partners are stipulated as unwarranted limitations to the right to marry. So the phrasing as it stands neither includes nor excludes polygamy or same-sex marriage as a right. Article 23 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights isn’t much clearer.

However, the case for same-sex or interracial marriage can be based on other articles, such as the non-discrimination provisions. Article 2 of the International Covenant states:

Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

Sexual orientation is not mentioned but it is accepted that the list given here is a list of examples and not exhaustive. “Without distinction of any kind” is clear enough. Article 3 states:

The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.

And Article 26:

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

It’s not clear whether polygamists can invoke the same non-discrimination provisions. Perhaps the right to privacy can help them. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence… Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

However, apart from the question whether polygamy can be defended or not on the basis of existing human rights law, there are some good reasons why perhaps there shouldn’t be a right to polygamous marriage, even if it can be established that there is such a right. Wives may be pressured into polygamous marriages or prohibited from exiting them; they may suffer inequality and oppression in their marriage; and young girls may be forced to marry. The same risks exist of course in normal monogamous marriage, but are perhaps more important in polygamous marriage.

Moreover, polygamous marriage poses certain risks that are non-existent in normal marriage: excess boys in polygamous communities are often ostracized and condemned to a life of poverty and homelessness; and there’s a risk that marriage as an institution and as a general right may suffer when polygamy becomes widespread:

Polygamy is bad social policy for exactly the reason gay marriage is good social policy: everyone should have the opportunity to marry. Broad access to marriage is important not only for individual wellbeing but for social stability. And, to oversimplify only a little, when one man gets two wives, some other man gets no wife. There’s no better path to inequality, social unrest, and authoritarian social structures than polygamy. (source)

And yet, if it’s the case that

  • polygamy remains a fringe custom
  • polygamists are generally exercising their free choice and informed consent
  • no children are forced to marry or are sexually abused
  • and excess boys are not ostracized

then why would anyone oppose polygamy? Monogamous marriage isn’t illegal because some wives are beaten or because there are some cases of monogamous child marriage. One could oppose polygamy for religious reasons, but those aren’t sufficient in liberal democracies. Polygamy can only be problematic when it’s a practice that regularly and intrinsically leads to rights violations, as it does when child brides are common, when wives are commonly forced into marriage or when widespread polygamy makes it very difficult for men to find brides and marry.

Another thing to consider is gender equality. Even if polygamy is rare enough not to deny men a reasonable chance of marriage, and even if all polygamous wives are adults who freely consent to their marriage and who have equal standing within their marriages, then it’s still the case that the practice itself can signal gender inequality and hence perpetuate it. The reason is that polygyny, by its very nature, signals that men have more rights than women: a man can take several wives, but not vice versa. A legal right to polygamy would of course also entail a right to polyandry, but it’s unlikely that the risks to gender equality created by polygyny would be offset by many cases of polyandry. The more likely result is that polygyny fosters preexisting misogynistic prejudice because polygyny will always be more common that polyandry.

So, in the end a lot depends on how often polygamy results in rights violations. Is polygamy more like child marriage, which by definition is a rights violation (it involves pedophilia, the denial of education, health problems resulting from pregnancy at an early age etc.)? Or is it more like monogamous or same-sex marriage, which may produce rights violations such as domestic violence, but not intrinsically so? If some practice by definition violates rights, it should obviously be prohibited. If the practice only does so by accident and exceptionally, then it should in general be protected, especially when the practice itself is a human right. I claim that there is nothing inherently wrong with polygamy, as long as it’s not set up in such a way that it violates rights – as long as in most cases the wives consent (in an informed way), children are left alone, boys aren’t ostracized, and the practice isn’t so widespread that men can’t marry or that women feel they are second class citizens.

In this respect, polygamy is similar to hate speech. In the case of hate speech we are also dealing with a presumptive right, but one that can be abrogated when its exercise becomes too widespread with negative consequences for the rights of others. When a small black minority for instance is overwhelmed by hate speech, to such an extent that black people can’t go outside for fear of constant insult, then their right to freedom of movement should trump the speech rights of the haters.

For a more pessimistic view on polygamy, go here.

Gender Discrimination (33): Reversing the Veil

Here’s an interesting story about the rule, common in many religions, against the exposure of the female body. Many Muslims and ultra-orthodox Jews argue that women should cover their hair with either a veil or a wig and should dress in such a way that their legs, arms, necks etc. are fully covered. Some go even further than this and claim that clothing prescriptions for women are insufficient: women should be segregated on busses, in public spaces, in schools etc. in order to minimize contact between the sexes. It’s assumed that men can only be protected against temptation and that society can only rid itself of the evil of illicit sexual relationships when contact with and exposure of women’s bodies are kept to a minimum.

Apparently, some ultra-orthodox Jews have understood that solving the problem of male temptation by restricting women’s freedoms is unfair. Hence, they are promoting special glasses that blur ultra-orthodox men’s vision, so they don’t have to see immodestly dressed women (source). The glasses are sold for $6. Obviously, they don’t only blur women but everything else as well. Everything up to a few meters is clear so as not to impede movement, but anything beyond that gets blurry — including women. Hoods and shields that block peripheral vision are also being offered.

Other orthodox Jews laugh at this and warn their fellow Jews to buy a crash helmet as well.

More on the veil here. More posts in this series are here.

Why Do We Need Human Rights? (29): Human Rights as Expressions of Human Duties in Early Protestant Thinking

Rights are often described as correlates of duties: if you have a right to something, someone else – or maybe everyone else – has a duty to respect your right. However,  it’s also possible to conceptualize your right as a means for you to execute your own duties. So, rather than your rights being my duties, your rights are your duties. This may sound weird but bear with me for a second.

Many early Protestants conceived of their rights exactly in this way. And if you know that Protestant thinking was one of the main driving forces behind the human rights revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries, then you also know that it’s important to understand the early Protestant mindset.

How exactly did they view human rights? The individual, according to early Protestants, has certain duties towards God: to exercise his or her religion, to honor God, to worship, to rest on Sunday, to proselytize, and to treat neighbors with care and love. These duties were then transformed into rights, not the rights of others but the rights of the duty bearers. A right became the expression of a duty. If it’s a duty to proselytize, then Protestants should have the right to free speech as a means to proselytize. If it’s a duty to worship God, then Protestants have a right to religious liberty. Etc. Protestants didn’t demand their rights and their freedom from government in order to pursue their desires and private wants, but in order to better be able to perform their religious duties.

Why do I mention this? It’s ancient history by now. These days, hardly anyone conceives of their rights in this way, and Protestants – especially American Protestants – are no longer at the frontline of the battle for human rights (if anything, they oppose many contemporary interpretations of human rights, such as same-sex marriage, abortion, social security etc.).

I mention it because it’s interesting to see how different people belonging to different traditions and cultures can account for human rights in different ways, using the resources available in their own heritage. I don’t think this particular Protestant interpretation of human rights is a convincing account – neither for me personally (I’m an agnostic) nor for present-day Protestants. But I do think that it can inspire others, and particularly those who belong to traditions that contain strong anti-rights strands, to have another look at their heritage and try to find an account of human rights that can be supported by other strands of the same tradition. I mean, if what we would now call fundamentalist Protestants could do it centuries ago, why not pious Muslims today?

All this boils down to the problem of the justification of human rights. Why do we need human rights? Even if you share Richard Rorty’s skepticism about foundationalism – as I do – you’ll still have to answer the question “but why?” if you talk about respecting rights to those who are hostile to them. There’s no way around that question. A particularly powerful answer is one that uses the resources available in the traditions of those who are hostile. An even more powerful answer is one that those people can come up with themselves. Seeing how others did it may inspire them. And I have no problem with different people coming up with totally different and even incompatible justifications of human rights. To put some words into the mouth of Jacques Maritain: I don’t care why people adhere to and respect human rights, as long as they do.

More on the justifications of human rights here, here and here.