The Causes of Poverty (25): The Matthew Effect

The Matthew Effect – a concept invented by sociologist Robert K. Merton – is based on the following extract of the Gospel of Matthew:

For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away.

This statement is intuitively convincing. Those who already have economic resources can use these to acquire even more of them, often if not by definition at the expense of those who don’t have them. It’s easy to see how wealthy people have better information to use their wealth in such a way that they can increase it. How they know the right people, how they can use the education system to their advantage (and to the advantage of their offspring), how they can use the political system to their advantage etc. Conversely, poor people are often stuck in a poverty trap: their poverty makes them sick, and their sickness even more poor; their poverty makes it hard to access education, and their lack of education makes them more poor etc.

You can see at once how this is relevant to the issue of human rights. While income or wealth inequality as such isn’t a human rights violation, it does have implications for human rights. And poverty is a human rights violation. But the Matthew Effect can be observed in other human rights as well. Take for instance the wiretapping that is used in the war on terror. Initially, wiretapping is targeted towards individuals who are suspected of plotting an attack. However, it seems inevitable that those who are authorized to use wiretapping expand the field of their authority. Instead of targeted wiretapping, they go on fishing expeditions: throwing out the nets as wide as possible and see which fishes end up in it. They start to use data-mining, for instance, checking private information of entire populations in order to filter out suspect individuals.

Another example of the Matthew Effect in human rights can be found in hate speech laws. The laws may initially impose limits on the freedom of speech that crack down on cases of hate speech that may cause violence and riots. However, once certain exceptions on the freedom of speech are legal and legitimate, the boundaries may move towards more restrictions. Maybe speech that doesn’t pose an imminent threat of violence but perhaps a longterm threat to the stability of a multicultural society – such as derogatory speech, or blasphemous speech – should also be prohibited. And then you may find yourself on a slippery slope.

I can also mention what I called “searchlight human rights violations” (see this previous post): for example, a certain level of sexual violence against women in a particular society, can teach young men a certain culture, mentality and value system that automatically leads to a wider use of violence.

However, I don’t believe things are as simple as this. While the Matthew Effect is certainly a force that is driving human rights violations, I don’t think there is anything inevitable or mechanical about it. There are other forces at play as well, and some of them go in the other direction. If that wouldn’t be the case, then the Matthew Effect would have landed us in a place where respect for human rights is non-existent, and would have done so a long time ago.

Regarding the particular case of wealth inequality, a simple application of the Matthew Effect would require a vision of the world with limited resources. And although some – important – resources are indeed limited, others – equally important ones – are not. It’s not because one person receives a good education, that another one must receive less education. And when one person accumulates riches, this can benefit others (his or her employees for example).

Limiting Free Speech (6): A Right Not to be Offended or Insulted?

In the previous post in this series I concluded that insulting or offending speech should not be forbidden, and is not a legitimate reason to limit the right to freedom of speech. Such limits are possible in general but should be exceptional given the importance of the freedom of speech. In the current post, I’ll flesh out the argument against limits on offending speech.

Offending speech is a slightly broader category than derogatory speech. The latter can be said to imply the intention to offend, ridicule or belittle, but offending speech in general does not imply this intention. People can be – and regularly are – offended by speech (or actions) that is not meant to offend.

Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as a right not to be offended. Such a right would create a duty not to offend. This duty goes much further than the duties normally assumed to be generated by tolerance. Tolerance forces people to abstain from

  • interfering with other people’s beliefs or practices
  • suppressing other people’s beliefs or practices
  • persecuting people with other beliefs or practices.

The focus is on the duties to abstain from actively interfering, suppressing or persecuting (or coercing in perhaps other ways). Tolerance forces us to leave people alone, even when – or rather especially when – we dislike, disapprove of or feel insulted by these people, because only then will we be tempted to intervene. We will not be tempted to intervene with people who leave us indifferent, in which case tolerance and the duties that arise from it are irrelevant.

A presumed right not to be offended can therefore be thought of as an exception to the duties of tolerance. When we accept such a right, we in fact claim that this right trumps some of our duties of tolerance in certain cases, namely in the cases when other people offend us. We should not tolerate offense, and the right to free speech of the offenders (of those who cause offense) should be limited by our right not to be offended. I say “some of our duties” because I don’t think that many people would claim that a right not to be offended should make it possible to go beyond limiting free speech, and should for example allow us to persecute offenders (some Muslims went this far in the case of the Muhammad cartoons).

If we assume that there is a right not to be offended and that this right has the consequences for tolerance which I have described, then we’ll quickly run into some insurmountable difficulties – and these difficulties will be a reason to reject the right not to be offended.

What are these difficulties? Let’s make a difference between active and passive offense. We can offend others by merely having certain beliefs or ways of lives. This passive offense does not result from an intention to offend. Active offense takes place when

  1. we knowingly and intentionally seek to offend others, by for example making certain derogatory claims about their beliefs and ways of lives, AND
  2. these others take offense.

If we focus on passive offense, then we must accept that it cannot be in itself offensive or disrespectful to have certain beliefs or ways of lives. Offense should entail the active intention to insult and cause offense. If we do not accept this, then we have to conclude that a right not to be offended triggers the duty to change beliefs or ways of life. And that is obviously outrageous.

Now, regarding active offense, the issues are, at first sight, much clearer. However, the problem is that there is no clear distinction between active and passive offense. It can be part of my beliefs and way of life that I should subject all views to rigorous criticism. And such criticism can cause offense. I know this, but still insist that I should criticize. Hence, I create active offense. A right not to be offended would then imply the duty to change my views and way of life, again outrageously.

Or it can be part of my beliefs that everybody should hear the word of God (my God). This as well can be insulting to adherents of another religion, who consider me to be a sinner, a false messenger leading humanity astray. A right not to be offended would again force me to deny myself.

Another problem with a possible right not to be offended is the fact that everything can be considered offensive by some people. It is impossible to predict what will or will not be considered offensive by someone, somewhere. A duty not to offend would ultimately lead to a duty to remain silent.

So, if offense is to be prohibited, and freedom of speech limited, then the only options would seem to be:

  • remain silent
  • force people to change their beliefs and ways of life
  • force people to be hypocrites.

Any one of these options is a nightmare. And the second one is self-contradictory because the rationale behind the proposal for a right not to be offended is precisely the necessity of respect for people’s beliefs and ways of life.

So it seems that offense and disrespect are a necessary price to pay for freedom of speech and the right to live your life according to you own choices and beliefs. However, this doesn’t mean that offense, ridicule, belittlement and disrespect are virtues. We shouldn’t make them illegal, but they shouldn’t be cherished either. They make it more difficult to have a rational debate on important subjects. They poison the debate and make it difficult to argue and persuade. So there are good reasons to avoid them, even if there are no good reasons to prohibit them.

The Causes of Human Rights Violations (10): Prejudice According to Allport’s Scale

People who are aware of, and ashamed of, their prejudices are well on the road to eliminating them. Gordon Allport

Gordon Allport, a psychologist, created Allport’s Scale in 1954. It’s a measure of the manifestation of prejudice in a society. The scale contains 5 stages of prejudice, ranked by the increasing harm they produce.

Stage 1: antilocution

Antilocution (“speaking against”) means making jokes about another group,’a0but also’a0the expression of hateful opinions. In the former case it’s also called derogatory speech, and in the latter case it’s called hate speech. Both cases can be examples of prejudice, prejudice in the sense of an opinion reflecting negative stereotypes and negative images based on preconceived judgments rather than facts.

Antilocution is often believed to be harmless (“sticks and stones will break your bones but names will never hurt you”), but it can harm the self-esteem of the people of the targeted group, and it can clear the way for more harmful forms of prejudice. The line between violent words and violent acts is often very thin. The self-image of a group can be hurt, which can sometimes become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Stage 2: avoidance

People in a group are actively avoided by members of another group. Harm is done through isolation and by preparing the way for more harmful acts. Xenophobia, or the fear of foreigners or strangers or of that which is foreign or strange, results in exclusion.

Stage 3: discrimination

A group is discriminated against by denying them equal access to opportunities, goods and services. Discrimination is intended to harm a group by preventing it from achieving goals, getting education or jobs, etc.

Stage 3b (added later): subtle aggression

This is an assumption of hierarchy, particularly hierarchy of power, an assumption that somebody has less knowledge because of their age, gender or race or other characteristics and that these people can be excluded in some way.

Stage 4: physical attack

This has become known as hate crime. Groups are the victim of vandalism, the burning of property or violent attacks on someone’s physical integrity such as lynchings, pogroms etc.

Stage 5: extermination

The extermination of a group through genocide, ethnic cleansing etc.

Limiting Free Speech (4): Derogatory Speech

In this series, I examine the possibility of limiting certain kinds of speech, and especially the possibility of legal limits. As stated in the introductory post in this series, such limits are possible but should be exceptional given the importance of the freedom of speech.

So-called derogatory speech is a form of speech which expresses ridicule, mockery, contempt or derision. It is a disparaging kind of speech that often takes the form of cartoons, caricatures, pamphlets, comedy shows, outright insults etc.

The main justification for limiting free speech is the possibility that speech violates others people’ s rights. When I claimed that limits are justified in the case of holocaust denial and hate speech, I did so because I believe that these kinds of speech can violate rights, and when rights come into conflict, a balance should be found and one right has to give way for the other. In some cases, limiting the right to free speech of holocaust deniers or hate preachers is a lesser harm than the harm that would be done if they were allowed to speak.

In the case of derogatory speech I think this is not the case. Derogatory speech is often silly, sad and pathetic, but the only harm it does is the insult suffered by the target, or perhaps a feeling of dishonor and a loss of self-esteem. People should be able to live with insults and there are no rights to protect self-esteem or honor. The reason we have a right to free speech is to protect speech that causes offense. Inoffensive speech hardly needs protection.

But is it really true that insult is the only harm produced by derogatory speech? One could argue that derogatory speech causes other kinds of harm. It perpetuates negative stereotypes of certain minority groups in society, groups which are already relatively vulnerable. Or it devalues the collective image of the group, thereby deepening social divisions and increasing the risk of discrimination. It may also erode the capacity of the majority culture to be receptive of new identities or communities. Tolerance may suffer.

Moreover, derogatory speech makes it more difficult to have a rational debate on important subjects. It poisons the debate. Neither the Muhammad cartoons, for example, nor the subsequent reactions from parts of the Muslim community did anything to foster the debate on the multicultural society. Ridicule, just as threats of violence, kill the discussion.

John Rawls reminded us that free speech should contribute to rational debate. The purpose of speech is to convince, to examine arguments, to revise one’ s opinions in the light of as much information as possible, to submit one’ s opinions to a critical public etc. Neither ridicule nor threats can advance such a vision of debate. (source)

All this is undoubtedly true, but is it enough to prohibit derogatory speech? I don’t think so. The best defense against harmful speech is either counter-speech or simple disregard. If we start to prohibit insulting speech, we take the slippery slope: anything can be insulting.