Why Do Countries Become/Remain Democracies? Or Don’t? (13): Prosperity

I already mentioned in a previous post how democracy is correlated with prosperity. There’s a much higher proportion of democracies among rich countries than among poor countries. The level of national income is the most important factor explaining inter-country variations in the degree of democracy. If we assume from this correlation that there is a causal link from prosperity to democracy, then low income is the most important barrier to democracy. But the causal link probably goes in both directions. Countries aren’t just democratic – or remain so – because they prosper (among other reasons), but it’s also the case that countries prosper to some extent because they are democratic (disproving the often heard claim that economic development requires authoritarian government).

The correlation between democracy and prosperity is obvious from this paper (at least for non-Muslim countries).

The stronger one of the causal links seems to be the one going from prosperity to democracy rather than vice versa. If you accept that, there’s an additional question (it’s one made famous by Przeworski and Limongi): are there more democracies among rich countries than among poor countries

• because economic development increases the likelihood that countries will undergo a transition to democracy (this is often called modernization theory), or
• because economic development makes democracies less likely to fall back into dictatorship?

Przeworski and Limongi found that affluence makes it very unlikely that a shift from democracy to dictatorship occurs, while Boix and Stokes find that there is an effect of affluence on the likelihood of a shift to democracy. Both effects are visible in this study.

It’s likely that the economic effect on transition towards democracy is a bit smaller than the effect halting the opposite transition. The reason is probably the fact that the transition from democracy to authoritarianism is in se much easier than the other way around. Some even say that democracy is inherently suicidal. Whatever the merits of that claim, it’s obvious that an authoritarian leader has the resources and the necessary lack of scruples to cling to power. Especially when his country becomes more prosperous. He can then use this prosperity to bribe the population into submission, and buy the arms and security forces when this doesn’t work.

Again, economic development isn’t a sufficient or even necessary prerequisite for democracy to appear or to survive. Things are more complicated than that and many other factors are in play, including conscious human activity and volition. People can decide to make or destroy a democracy at any level of economic development.

What is Democracy? (50): The I-Did-It-My-Way Syndrome

In discussions about the promotion of democracy in those parts of the world where it hasn’t been (firmly) established yet, the skeptical side of the argument usually advances either or both of the following positions:

• Democracy is a political form typical of the West and undesirable or impossible elsewhere.
• Democracy is a political concept which is defined in different ways according to the culture in which it is applied. When promoting democratic government in certain places, we are in fact promoting standard Western democracy when we should in fact be promoting something quite different.

The first position often includes references to cultural or religious preconditions for democracy which are claimed to be absent in certain countries (notably Muslim countries, which supposedly have a hard time accepting the separation of state and religion, the rule of law, gender equality and other elements of democracy). Or it includes arguments about economic preconditions which are absent (democracy being OK for the wealthy West, but not for countries which have other, more urgent economic concerns). And, finally, the size of countries, or their ethnic mix, is said to make democracy very difficult to achieve, or to make it an element which can undermine national harmony and stability. Democracy is viewed as something which reinforces communal or tribal antagonism because the different political parties tend to be formed along ethnic or tribal dividing lines. As a consequence, these parties see it as their role to defend the communal interest and nothing else, and once they are in power they tend to do so by discriminating against other communities. In such countries, democracy degenerates into an ethnic census.

The second position doesn’t reject the possibility or desirability of democracy in certain countries, but claims that the western definition of democracy can’t and shouldn’t be imposed outside of the West without taking into account the local, cultural, historical and social circumstances. There should be different models of democracy for different parts of the world. The western model is not a panacea and is not adapted to all circumstances.

Needless to say that this second position tends to collapse into the first one: if democracy is a very open concept that can include very different procedures, rules and institutions, then it can also exclude elements of democracy which we normally see as essential parts of democracy. An “African democracy” or “Asian democracy” or whatever, may turn out to be not very democratic. Indeed, such concepts are often mere smokescreens used by dictators weary of rejecting democracy altogether.

However, there is some element of truth in both positions. Democracy is undoubtedly tied to certain preconditions, and is impossible without those. And, in certain specific circumstances, such as a war or a national emergency, democracy – or full democracy – may be – temporarily – undesirable. Moreover, countries have to be able to follow their own path and to organize their societies according to their own views and traditions, and not according to those of the West. The Western model isn’t by definition the only desirable one, or the best one. It is not up to the West to decide what is and what is not politically acceptable in countries with entirely different traditions. Democracy can take different forms. Even among Western countries, there are vast differences between the types of democracy that are applied.

It’s wrong to copy the specifically Western view of democracy “à la lettre” in the rest of the world. Within certain limits, we have to take local and cultural aspects into consideration and we have to be flexible where we can. But there are limits. A democracy can’t be just anything. Otherwise we would be defending nihilism. If some elements are missing – such as freedom of speech, association and assembly, regular, fair and free elections, the rule of law etc. – then we can hardly speak of democracy.

The Causes of Poverty (8): Lack of Economic Freedom

Open markets offer the only realistic hope of pulling billions of people in developing countries out of abject poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialized world. Kofi Annan

Africa must be allowed to trade itself out of poverty. Bob Geldof

Human rights do not include a right to have economic freedom or to have a free market. But one can argue that economic freedom is a necessary consequence of human rights and that the absence of economic freedom is an indication of a country’s disrespect for human rights. The right to do with your property as you like, to move freely and to associate freely are all human rights and are prerequisites and causes of economic freedom.

There’s also a strong case in favor of the theory that economic freedom promotes prosperity and hence also respect for economic rights.

Economic freedom consists of personal choice, the ability to make voluntary transactions, the freedom to compete, and security of privately owned property. This is the definition of the Fraser Institute. This institute tries to measure the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries support economic freedom. Their index measures:

• size of government
• legal structure and security of property rights
• access to sound money
• freedom to trade internationally and
• regulation of credit, labor and business.

They conclude that economic freedom has grown considerably in recent decades and that economic freedom is correlated with income.

 

The complete list of countries is here. I don’t want to suggest that economic freedom should be absolute. There has to be regulation of markets (for health reasons, safety reasons, reasons of fair competition etc.) as well as political corrections of the effects of markets on issues of social justice, poverty and equality.

Moreover, when discussing economic freedom we shouldn’t only think of the internal structure of states but also their interaction: import tariffs, quota, subsidies and other protectionist measures also inhibit free trade, often at the expense of poor traders and farmers in developing countries.

What Are Human Rights? (15): Constitutionally Universal

The theme of this post is the often difficult relationship between citizenship and human rights. This relationship is difficult because human rights, which are explicitly rights for all people everywhere, without distinctions of any kind, seem to require citizenship, and hence a distinction between groups of somehow differentiated people, for their protection. Without citizenship, it is argued, human rights remain a wish rather than a reality, potential rather than effective. Indeed, we often see that non-citizens such as refugees, asylum-seekers or stateless people suffer more rights violations than the citizens of the countries in which they happen to find themselves, even if these countries are comparatively well functioning democracies.

I want to argue that there are no legal reasons to consider citizenship as some kind of necessary condition for the protection of the rights of people within the territory of a state. Or, to put it negatively, that there are no legal reasons to treat the rights of non-citizens with less respect than the rights of citizens, or to accept violations of the rights of non-citizens with more ease than violations of the rights of citizens. There has to be, in other words, equality of protection between citizens and non-citizens. Citizenship therefore should be irrelevant for the protection of the human rights of the people within a given state territory. The state should be blind in this respect and treat non-citizens as if they were citizens. Non-citizens should have the same legal, judicial and other means to stand up for their rights.

The legal argument is based on Article 2, paragraph 1 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states the following:

“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”.

The widely held but mistaken belief that the rights of non-citizens residing in a state are, perhaps inevitably, more precarious than the rights of the citizens living beside them, goes back to the historically important role of citizenship in the practice of protecting human rights. Theoretically, citizenship is irrelevant to human rights. These rights are the equal rights of all human beings, equally and unconditionally. It is not justified to say that one should be white, male, citizen or whatever to be able to enjoy the protection of these rights. Universality, equality and unconditionality are perhaps the main characteristics of human rights. That is where they got their name. They would not be called human rights if this were not the case.

Although theoretically these rights come with no conditions attached, in reality and in practice there are many necessary conditions for their effective protection: a well functioning judiciary, a separation of powers, a certain mentality, certain economic conditions etc. Too many to name them all, unfortunately. But the one we should name and explain is citizenship. Historically, it was because people were citizens of a state that they could use and improve the institutions and judicial instruments of the state, including the executive powers, to enforce their rights. It is this historical contingency, the fact that people have always found their citizenship very useful for their human rights, which has led many to believe that there is some kind of special link between citizenship and human rights which makes it possible and acceptable to treat the rights of non-citizens with less respect. That rights are only accessible to citizens. That the rights of man have often been the “rights of an Englishman” in the words of Burke.

“The survivors of the extermination camps, the inmates of concentration and internment camps, and even the comparatively happy stateless people could see … that the abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger” (Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism).

The state, although it does not grant rights, has to recognize them and make them real, but not only for citizens. The constitution, the main instrument for recognizing human rights, should and nowadays often does explicitly guarantee rights for humans, and not merely rights for citizens. Everybody within the territory of the state, not only the citizens of the state, can then enjoy the human rights protected by the constitution. Citizens as well as non-citizens can then go to court and challenge unjust laws or acts of state. Both categories of people have legal personality. This is often called the constitutional universality of rights.

The protection of the economic rights of non-citizens is an even more contentious matter. Should non-citizens have the same healthcare protection, social security, education etc.? In principle yes, but some countries may have such a large number of non-citizens in their territory that the economic viability of their social security system comes under threat. The tax payers ability to fund the system is limited, and non-citizens normally don’t pay taxes.

What Are Human Rights? (10): Dependent on Prerequisites

People often oppose the universal application of democracy and human rights because they believe that in some places, some of the prerequisites are absent. Their point of view is not that democracy and human rights are in themselves objectionable or undesirable, but that some countries are not mature enough yet (as in the case of economic prerequisites for example) or will perhaps never be mature enough (as in the case of cultural prerequisites for example). Instead of being undesirable, democracy and human rights are (as yet) impossible.

One has to deal with this line of argument, for two reasons. Firstly, because we will dispose of a reason to universalize democracy and human rights if we can show that the argument is incorrect. Secondly, because we will know what to do or change in order to universalize democracy and human rights if it is established that the argument is correct.

In some cases it is correct. Democracy and human rights are indeed conditional. They depend on certain prerequisites for their existence, survival and development. However, this is not a reason for fatalism or for the rejection of universality. It does not mean that democracy or human rights are forever impossible. The necessary conditions can invariably be created, with more or less effort. An example of this is the absence of media monopolies. It is impossible to introduce democracy if the pre-democratic and authoritarian monopoly ownership of the media is maintained. If this monopoly is not abolished with the introduction of democracy, then the old rulers will use their monopoly of the media in order to maintain or to return to power. The absence of this kind of monopoly is a prerequisite for democracy but it is a prerequisite that can be created. The same is true for most if not all the other prerequisites.

What is most interesting is that democracy and human rights do a lot themselves to create or promote the conditions necessary for their survival and development. Instead of “fit for democracy”, we should say “fit through democracy”, in the words of Amartya Sen. You can only become fit for democracy when you already have a democracy. Once democracy and human rights begin to win ground, they improve the chances of their own survival and future development. Here’s a post on peace, which is obviously a precondition for but is also promoted by democracy and rights.

However, it remains a fact that, without important efforts, democracy and human rights are not universally possible yet, even if they are universally necessary or desirable. Fortunately, there are many different kinds of prerequisites and the absence of one can be compensated for by the presence of others. Furthermore, many so-called prerequisites are in fact no more than excuses for rights violations and authoritarian government. If some people claim that a particular country is not yet mature enough for democracy and human rights, then it is very likely that these people have an interest in rights violations and authoritarian government. Those who suffer never claim that they are not mature enough for rights. We should not rush to conclusions. It is very tempting to call something a prerequisite, especially for opponents of democracy and rights.

Among the prerequisites that are not really prerequisites, culture is probably the most important one. Democracy and human rights develop somewhere and have their origins in the life of a community, but this does not mean that their development in this community was necessary or that their development in other, very different communities, is impossible. Democracy and rights can develop in communities with very different cultures, even in communities that do not have a democratic tradition (take the case of post-war Germany for instance). They are connected, not to a culture, but to mankind and to the values of mankind. Of course, there can be elements in some cultures which promote the development of democracy and rights and elements in other cultures which hinder this development (perhaps Protestantism and Catholicism respectively). However, the main causes and prerequisites, namely the values which need democracy and human rights, are present everywhere.

The argument for cultural prerequisites implies that certain cultures are destined for democracy and that other cultures can never be democracies. At an even deeper level, it implies that cultures cannot and should not change. The different cultural identities must be protected against more powerful and hostile cultures engaging in cultural imperialism. A culture which is supposed to be incompatible with democracy must remain undemocratic for its own sake. However, this obscures the fact that cultures and traditions do change and often even want to change. On top of that, many traditions are not as old as they seem. They are often recent creations (anti-democratic traditions are in most cases inventions of authoritarian rulers). So why not create a democratic tradition?

What is Democracy? (6): Democracy and Human Rights

All human rights must be respected, and respected simultaneously, in order to have a proper democratic process. Many tyrannies allow the existence of opposition groups and even, sometimes, a limited degree of political participation, but these groups are harmless because they do not have equal access to publicity, because they do not have the freedom to organise as they wish, or because the people lack the material or intellectual resources necessary to be able to choose wisely among candidates.

It is apparent from this enumeration that the link between democracy and human rights (all human rights) is quite intense. Human rights institutionalize and guarantee conflict in general, and political conflict in particular. Choosing political leaders is the expression of an opinion. Read also art. 3 of Protocol I to the European Convention on Human Rights:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”.

There is obviously a reason for the etymological link between the words “vote” and “voice”. Democracy is the application of human rights to the field of government. Human rights are democratic rights because they are necessary for democracy, just as democracy is necessary for human rights. The latter is also hinted at in the considerations preceding the articles of the European Convention:

“those fundamental freedoms which … are best maintained … by an effective political democracy”.

But human rights are not just a necessary prerequisite for democracy. They bring about democracy. When you have the right to express your opinions and to call all kinds of things into question, why would you stop at the government? You will automatically express an opinion on the government and call the government into question. And because it is futile and sad to express an opinion that has no consequences in the real world, people will begin to claim the implementation of their political opinions, which will be the birth of democracy.

Democracy and human rights cannot function separately. They need each other and reinforce each other. Where you have one, you also have the other. And where you have one without the other, there is something missing in what you have. A democracy without human rights is not an ideal democracy, because it cannot function adequately. Human rights without democracy are not complete because one of the most important uses of human rights – calling into question the work of the government and creating a common point of view on the work of the government – is not allowed, or, if it is allowed, does not have any useful consequences because it is impossible to have a democratic vote.

Human rights are not politically or ideologically neutral. They require democracy and are required by democracy. This supports the statement that human rights are not something primarily directed against politics or a way to limit politics. There are an essential part of democratic politics.

The Causes of Human Rights Violations (3): Absence of Peace

If man does find the solution for world peace it will be the most revolutionary reversal of his record we have ever known. George C. Marshall

Peace or the absence of war and violent struggle is, of course, another important prerequisite for democracy and human rights. Human rights and the principles of democracy are heavily violated in times of war and this is even necessary. And although many human rights violations committed in the course of a war are not necessary, it is impossible to insist that all human rights and democratic principles be fully applied in a war situation. A war, because of the urgency it creates, makes it very difficult to respect certain democratic habits, such as the consultation of large parts of the population, the thorough examination of all alternatives etc. A strong, individual leadership seems better adapted to the urgencies of war. On top of that, the war effort and the war industry require a unity of vision and a high level of cooperation without dissent. Dissent can harm the struggle for survival. It weakens the effectiveness of common actions and it can be exploited by the enemy. In a state of war, society and politics take over many of the undemocratic habits of the military, such as unity of command, discipline, strong leadership, the absence of criticism, uniformity instead of diversity and so on. Needless to say that a war also means human rights violations. The war industry as well can harm human rights, for example the rights concerning free choice of labor, good working conditions etc.

A right to peace would, therefore, be very useful. Here I argue that democracy and human rights do a lot to create and maintain the peace they need for their own functioning.

Why Do We Need Human Rights? (2)

Is it still necessary these days to promote the virtues of human rights and democracy (democracy being just one of many human rights)? Is it not kicking in an open door?

It seems that the end of the Cold War has settled the intellectual dispute. Democracy and human rights no longer have any rivals. There are no alternatives.

I’m not so sure. Democracy and human rights, to the extent that they are measurable, do not seem to flourish beyond expectations after the end of the Cold War, unless we limit democracy to a system of elections and human rights to the absence of extreme cruelty. And even then. 
There is progress, but not enough. There are also still theoretical challenges to the foundations of human rights and democracy (I’m thinking of radical nationalism, all sorts of religious fundamentalism, economic theories advocating limits on human rights etc.). Moreover, people in established Western democracies seem to exhibit a growing unease about the nature of their victorious political systems.

So a theoretical defense of the universal value of rights and democracy and of the reasons why they are so important, and universally important, is not useless or out-of-date. History, in other words, has not ended.

Why does the world need human rights and democracy? A lot depends on the definition of these words. I would favor a “heavy” definition: democracy is more than elections and representation. Human rights are more than freedom rights or the absence of genocide.

Of course, I can see practical problems: not all the necessary (never mind sufficient) preconditions for a heavy system of rights and democracy are everywhere available. So lighter versions are obviously acceptable, temporarily, and often a great leap forward compared to current political and legal systems. And much needs to be done to promote the conditions for going further. A reasonably well-functioning democracy without a solid protection system for human rights is much better than a dictatorship, but it’s not enough. Purely representative democracy as well is not enough, but is great progress in many places. Shortcomings in imperfect democracies and imperfect systems for rights protection should not lead to us reject democracy and rights altogether, but should convince us to make them better.

I’m convinced that democracy and human rights promote certain universal human values, and hence are universally desirable themselves. Universal human values are things which humans invariably deem important for their lives. Some examples: control over your own life, economic wellbeing, peace, physical security, property, belonging, identity etc.